An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)

Research article (2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2018) · cited 10× · AI/ML
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An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)

Summary

An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents) is a scholarly article[1].

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  • An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)'s instance of is recorded as scholarly article[2].

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APA 4ort.xyz Knowledge Graph. (2026). An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). Retrieved May 24, 2026, from https://4ort.xyz/entity/an-end-to-end-argument-in-mechanism-design-prior-independent-auctions-for-budgeted-agents
MLA “An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents).” 4ort.xyz Knowledge Graph, 4ort.xyz, 24 May. 2026, https://4ort.xyz/entity/an-end-to-end-argument-in-mechanism-design-prior-independent-auctions-for-budgeted-agents.
BibTeX @misc{4ortxyz_an-end-to-end-argument-in-mechanism-design-prior-independent-auctions-for-budgeted-agents_2026, author = {{4ort.xyz Knowledge Graph}}, title = {{An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents)}}, year = {2026}, url = {https://4ort.xyz/entity/an-end-to-end-argument-in-mechanism-design-prior-independent-auctions-for-budgeted-agents}, note = {Accessed: 2026-05-24}}
LLM prompt According to 4ort.xyz Knowledge Graph (aggregator of Wikidata, Wikipedia, and authoritative open-data sources): An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents) — https://4ort.xyz/entity/an-end-to-end-argument-in-mechanism-design-prior-independent-auctions-for-budgeted-agents (retrieved 2026-05-24)

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